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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAX E. BIRCH and FONTELLA ) 
BIRCH, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 1 Case 
FORREST W. FULLER and JUDITH HYDE ~No. 8822 
FULLER, his wife, KENNETH W. JUDD 
and RUBY F. JUDD, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants, in their brief, omit most of the pertinent 
facts of the case, and for this reason, the Respondents 
object to the Appellants' facts and make the following 
statement of facts: 
In the fall of 1956 the Defendant Appellant, Forrest W. 
Fuller, was employed by the Plaintiff Respondents to sell 
real property owned by them in Duchesne County. In the 
spring of 1957 the said real property was to be sold for 
taxes unless the back taxes were paid, and inasmuch as the 
1. 
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'.(,! 
Appellant Fuller had not found a buyer for the property, 
he agreed to attempt to borrow money on the property for 
the Respondents, and in order to borrow the money he 
advised Respondents that if they would sign a Real Estate 
Contract on the property with someone with a good credit 
rating, he would be able to borrow a couple of thousand 
dollars for them in order to pay off the taxes and save the 
property from being sold. The Respondents were dubious 
of this matter but upon being assured by the Appellant 
Fuller, who was representing them as their attorney at this 
time, that all was legal and that there would be no compli-
cations, the Respoadents signed a Real Estate Contract 
to sell the property to one Robert R. Sather, the Defendant, 
which is shown as Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A". This contract 
was never to have been a binding contract, but oniy for 
the purpose of borrowing money for the Respondents to 
pay taxes and other outstanding bills. On or about March 
31, 1957, the Def::~ndant Sather and the Respondents execu-
ter a mortgage in favor of Security Loan and Finance 
Corporation at Duchesne, Utah, and turned the same over 
to the Appellant Fuller to borrow the funds, and at the 
same time, authorized the Appellant Fuller to receive the 
$2,000.00 for the Respondents with directions that he was 
to pay certain obligations then outstanding against the 
Respondents as their attorney. At the time of executing 
said mortgage, the Appellant Fuller gave the Respondents 
his personal check in the sum of $891.87 to pay the taxes 
on the property before the same became delinquent, which 
sum was to have been deducted from the $2,000.00 which 
2. 
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the Appellant was to receive on the loan. The check of 
the Appellant Fuller was given to the Duchesne County 
Treasurer the following day to pay the taxes. However, 
the check was returned about April 5th with the notation 
that there were not sufficient funds to pay the same. On 
or about April lOth, the Respondent Max Birch called to 
the office of the Appellant Fuller and advised him that the 
check had not been paid and the Appellant Fuller gave him 
a new check with an additional $2.50 as protest fees to 
cover the check that had been returned and advised the 
Respondent that there were sufficient funds in the bank to 
cover the check at this time; that the Respondent Max 
Birch called the Continental Bank and was advised that 
no funds were available to pay the check at that time. The 
Appellant Fuller was to have paid payments to Wheeler 
Machinery Company of Salt Lake and to J Harold Call 
of Heber, Utah, on judgments rendered against the Res-
pondents; that checks were made by Fuller to pay these 
two accounts but were returned marked "Insufficient 
Funds" and a check was also given to Respondent for the 
sum of $50.00 which was marked "Insufficient Funds" when 
presented for payment and which check was not paid until 
after the Respondent signed a complaint for issuing a check 
against insufficient funds. The checks to J Harold Call 
and Wheeler Machinery were finally made good approxi-
mately thirty to sixty days after the mortgage was signed. 
There is still $50.00 outstanding which the Appellant Fuller 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On or about April 20, 1957, the Respondents rented 
the oil rights in said land to the Standard Oil Company of 
California and the Appellant Fuller was informed of this 
lease by the agent of Standard Oil Company and the 
Appellant Fuller immediately then made a payment of 
$290.00 on the mortgage to the Security Loan and Finance 
Corporation and sent the Uniform Real Estate Contract of 
January 31, 1957, to the Defendant Robert R. Sather to be 
notarized and recorded, which was done. 
A:t a later date, Respondent Max E. Birch and Defend-
ant Sather entered into an option agreement for the same 
land as described in the prlor Uniform Real Estate Contract 
except thart Respondents' home was not to be included, 
and within a day or two thereafter, Defendant Sather exe-
cuted a release of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit "B"). 
Subsequent to the execution of the Sather-Birch option, 
the Appellents Kenneth W. Judd and Forrest Fuller as 
partners (transcript, Judd D-62-16) personally and by and 
through their agents, entered upon the property of Respond-
ents, tore down buildings and corrals located thereon and 
erected new corrals and fences and took over farming of 
said premises, the Respondents retaining possession of their 
home. 
The Appellants, personally and by and through their 
agents, continued farming the premises and doing other 
work thereon until the early part of July, 1957, when a 
dispute arose among the Respondents and the Appellants 
4. 
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as to the use of the ground, inasmuch as the option had not 
been exercised by Sather, and as a result of said dispute, a 
notice of Lis Pendens was filed in the County Recorder's 
office on July 9, 1957, by the Appellants, and the following 
day, the Defendant F. A. Hatch served a notice to vacate 
upon the Respondents, which notice claimed that the Appel-
lants Forrest W. Fuller, Judith Hyde Fuller, Kenneth W. 
Judd and Ruby F. Judd were owners of the property and 
that unless the Respondents paid to the Appellants the sum 
of $510.00 within five days, they would be evicted (tran-
script Birch D-43-8, 9 and Plaintiffs' Exhibit G) . 
The Appellants never filed an action as alleged in their 
Lis Pendens and so on or about July 29, 1957, the Respond-
ents filed a complaint naming Appellants as Defendants and 
asking damages for slander of title and unauthorized tres-
pass. 
That the Appellants and Defendants continued farming 
and in possesion of said premises during the month of 
August to the detriment of the Respondents, and therefore, 
it became necessary for an order to show cause and tem-
porary restraining order to issue, which was done on the 
13th day of August, 1957, which rna tter was heard on the 
17th day of August, 1957, before the Honorable Maurice 
Harding at the Courthouse in Duchesne County without a 
reporter, at which time the several Appellants and Defend-
ants and Respondents testified as to the facts set out here-
inabove and the Court ordered that a bond in the sum of 
$375.00 be posted by the Appellants before allowing their 
5. 
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livestock to feed any further on the premises of the Re-
spondents and before they continued to harvest any of the 
crops thereon; that said bond was subsequently filed and 
the Appellants allowed their livestock to graze upon the 
Respondents' ground and harvested the crops thereon. 
That after several delays at the request of the Appel-
lants, the matter finally came to trial on November 25, 1957, 
at 11:15 o'clock A. M., in the County Courthouse at Du-
chesene, Utah, at which time a stipulation was entered 
into by the attorneys for the parties to the effect that the 
Court, having previously heard the testimony as to the 
above facts upon the order to show cause and having dis-
cussed the same in pre-trial, agreed that the trial would 
:~::: proceed from the standpoint of damages for the entry of 
:"Ri:~ any Defendants onto the land and any damages that may 
have been sustained because of slander of title (Birch, 
D-5-23). 
During the trial, several witnesses for the Plaintiff 
Respondents were called and testified as to the damages 
sustained by the Respondents. Upon stipulation of the 
parties, the Court and counsel recessed to view the premises 
at which time the Court was shown the actual damages 
sustained by the Respondents. Upon the Court's convening, 
it was stipulated that the Appellants had filed a Lis Pendens 
upon the property and that no suit had been filed by the 
Defendants, Forrest W. Fuller and Judith Hyde Fuller and 
Kenneth W. Judd and Ruby F. Judd upon which a Lis 
Pendens could be based. (transcript, page 77). 
6. 
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That in order to save time and so that the matter 
would not have to be continued to some later date, the 
parties stipulated to the Court as to the testimony they 
would offer if their witnesses were caUed, and after said 
stipulations were read into record, the Court considered 
all the testimony offered, the stipulations as made, the 
Exhibits as offered and all the facts presented, and the 
Court found that the Lis Pendens had been filed without 
just cause and with malice and entered judgement against 
the Defendants, Forrest W. Ful'ler and Judith Hyde Fuller, 
his wife, and Kenneth W. Judd and Ruby F. Judd, his wife 
in the amount of $128.00 actual damages and $500.00 at-
torney's fee from slander of title and $877.00 less $435.00 
set off for trespass. 
ARGUMENT 
Answer to Point 1: Appellants, in their argument, 
attempt to show that there was no bad faith in filing the 
Lis Pendens, and therefore, no basis for damages. However, 
the facts of this case clearly show that there could be no 
other basis for filing the Lis Pendens other than malice on 
the part of the Appellants. 
"While malice is not necessarily presumed from 
the falsity of the statement of the defendant, 
it may in certain cases be inferred therefrom, 
or from other facts or circumstances, as where 
the attendant circumstances convincingly point 
to the inference that the party charged with the 
slander of title was not in good faith endeavoring 
to uphold or assert a supposedly valid claim of 
7. 
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title in himself." 33 American Jurisprudence, 
319, Section 359. 
"It was not incumbent upon plaintiff to es-
tablish malice by direct evidence. It is sufficient 
if a reasonable inference of malice may be drawn 
from the evidence. Of course, if the defendant 
at the time of making such statement knew it had 
no lease or had no probable cause for believing 
it had one, it acted maliCiously. Where different 
reasonable inferences can be drawn from the 
evidence on such issue, the question is for the 
jury to decide. In this connection, we ask, why 
did the defendant remove its advertising signs 
from the premises if it honestly believed it had 
a lease? We think the good faith of the defendant 
is challenged by the evidence." Cawrse v. Signal 
Oil Company, 103 P. (2d) 729. 
"As we have shown above plaintiff had plead-
ed that the claim set forth in the instrument 
recorded by defendant was false. That was suff-
icient averment of falsity. The instrument claim-
ed that the land apparently owned by plaintiff in 
reality belonged to defendant because it had been 
purchased by plaintiff as agent for defendant. 
This claim was false. It is not necessary, as 
argued by defendant, that all the words be false, 
it is sufficient if the statement which disparages 
the plaintiff's interest in his property is fa'lse." 
Dowse v. Doris Trust Company (Supreme Court 
of Utah) 208 P. (2d) 956, 958. 
The Appellants never claimed any right or interest in 
Respondents' premises by filing a counter-claim to Respond-
ents's complaint, but just filed an answer admitting posses-
sion. Further, the Appellants never objected to the Court's 
8. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
quieting title in the Respondents (Paragraph 4 of Judgment) 
which further shows that they had no interest in the pro-
perty and no basis for filing the Lis Pendens. 
Such fact of malice or lack of just cause was amply 
found by the Court, which finding will not be disturbed. 
"Therefore, in accord with the holdings of this 
court, that the judgment of the trial court will 
not be disturbed, unless the evidence clearly pre-
ponderates against its findings; or there has been 
a plain abuse of discretion, or where manifest in-
justice or inequity is present, we affirm the 
court's ruling * * *" Beezley v Beezley, 296 P. 
(2d) 274, 277. (Utah Supreme Court, 1956). 
Answer to Point 2: The Appellants, Judith Hyde Fuller, 
Ruby F. Judd and Forrest W. Fuller, attempt to claim that 
there is no evidence introduced to show that they had ever 
entered upon the land of the Respondents, whereas para-
graph 2 of their answer to the Plaintiffs' complint, which 
was filed in this matter on August 20, 1957, fully admits 
this as follows: 
"2' Defendants deny each and every allega-
tion contained in Plaintiff's SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION except that they admit they are in pos-
session persuant (sic) to an agreement made by 
the Plaintiffs to sell the property which the De-
fendants are occupying to the defendants Forrest 
W. Fuller and Kenneth W. Judd." 
Inasmuch as the Defendants by their answer had ad-
mitted possession of the premises and as a result of the 
9. 
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discussion at pre-trial wherein the Defendants fully admit-
ted possession, the Court decided to hear only testimony 
concerning the measure of damages that the Respondents 
had suffered. (Birch, D-4-27, 28, and Birch D-5-23, 24 and 
25). 
All pre-trial discussions on this matter showed that 
;: :~ the Appellants, Forrest W. Fuller and Judith Hyde Fuller, 
his wife, and Kenneth W. Judd and Ruby F. Judd, his wife, 
were partners in operating and farming the Birch premises. 
This is clearly shown by the letter from Appellant Fuller 
to the Respondents, Plaintiff's Exhibit "F", and by the 
testimony of Appellant Judd to the effect that he and 
Fuller were partners. (transcript, Judd D-62-16). 
The Respondents allowed the Appellants to come onto 
the premises and farm the same because of the option they 
had entered into with Defendant Sather, (transcript, Birch 
D-9-1, 2) whereas the Appellants went into possession of the 
property under guise of the said Uniform Real Estate 
,~ ::: Contract or under some other guise and without any right, 
title or authority whatsoever, (transcript Judd D-61-1-22). 
CONCLUSION 
The facts in this case show a brazen attempt on the 
part of the Appellants to occupy and farm the property of 
the Respondents without any right, ti·tle or authority what-
soever, or at the most, under the guise of a fraudulent real 
estate contract without any intention whatsoever to pay for 
the feed and crops removed therefrom, and further, that 
10. 
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the Lis Pendens was filed against this property solely for the 
purpose of maliciously causing the Respondents great 
trouble and expense and to prevent them from freely dis-
posing of their property. Further, the Appellants by ad-
mitting in their answer that they had possession of the 
property and were occupying the same and by their failure 
to file a counter-claim alleging title or right to the property 
and not objecting to the findings and decree quieting title 
in the Respondents are now estopped to deny that said Lis 
Pendens was filed without just cause and that they "ever 
entered upon the land of the Respondents." 
The Court's denying Appellantss' motion to dismiss and 
granting judgment a~ainst the Defendants was therefore 
proper under the facts and circumstances of this case. 
RESPEcrFULLY SUBMITTED: 
/ / /,1/t{Mi(~ 
( George B. Stanley and 
' Richard L. Maxf~d 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Respondents 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
